Same-sex marriage has become a divisive issue in established western democracies.
Introduction
Public opinion provides an important barometer of likely future voting patterns and legislative recognition of gay marriage and abortion rights. As a number of scholars have noted, landmark legislative decisions, particularly at the national level, have often been precipitated by shifting opinions among the general public. This seems to be particularly the case when the question of gay rights is considered. In fact, some scholars go so far as to suggest that the political endorsement and legislative activity in relation to gay marriage in the United States and Europe reflects a 'sea change' in public opinion in support for gay marriage, particularly over the last two decades Brewer (2014) . This is not to deny, however, that there are ongoing and heated debates, and some important differences, both within and between nations, in relation to this issue. There is also a notable East/West divide in Europe, with significantly lower levels of support for same-sex marriage as well as gay rights, generally among former communist countries, such as Poland (Fitzgerald et al., 2014) .
Accompanying these changes in public opinion and legislative rights for gay couples, there is also a growing body of research examining the social correlates of attitudes towards same-sex marriage, albeit more so in the United States than in Europe and elsewhere. As in studies on attitudes towards abortion Wilcox, 2003, 2005; Froese and Bader, 2010; Barkan, 2014; Clements, 2015; Lizotte, 2015) , such research finds that religious factors such as affiliation, regular church attendance and beliefs in and about God are among the most frequent predictors of opposition to gay marriage (Olson et al., 2006; Whitehead, 2010; Clements and Field, 2014; Hayes and Dowds, 2015) . Religious communities have also been divided internally in their response to changing public views. In fact, some analysts go so far as to suggest that public disputes and differences in opinion over homosexual rights have now replaced abortion as the most significant and divisive moral issue facing many religious communities today (Wilcox, 2007; Badgett, 2009; McKinnon et al., 2011; Hayes and Dowds, 2015; Brittain and McKinnon, 2018) .
Although an increasing number of studies have included religious measures in their analysis of support for either gay marriage or abortion rights, to date, little effort has been made to understand exactly how the effect of these religious factors, such as religious traditions, practices and beliefs, shape public opinion. Moreover, there has been almost no attempt to investigate how the two key dimensions of religious lifepractices and beliefs -intertwine in determining attitudes towards both these issues, even though sociologists have found interactions between belief and practice in their effects on a range of other outcome variables (McKinnon 2003; Paxton, Reith and Glanville 2014; Schieman et al., 2017) . To date, studies that have been conducted have tended to adopt a singular approach, namely seeking to evaluate and compare the independent, or net, effect of each of these religious measures on attitudes towards abortion or gay rights. It is with this omission in mind that this study focuses directly on the link between religious beliefs and practices in assessing the impact of religion on attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion, currently two of most salient public moral issues in Northern Ireland (Thomson, 2016) . More specifically, using data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Study and applying the typologybelieving and belonging -it seeks to assess the degree to which the differing intersections of belief and practice are a key distinguishing factor in predicting attitudes towards both gay marriage and reproductive rights within this society.
The use of Northern Ireland as a case study may be considered particularly appropriate for the following three reasons. First, unlike many other western postindustrial nations, Northern Ireland remains a deeply religious society. Despite the subjective and voluntary nature of religious identification within this society, Northern Ireland continues to maintain a very high rate of religious belonging.
Current survey data suggest that just over 90 per cent of the adult population selfidentify with a religious affiliation, the vast majority of which belong to either the Protestant (46 per cent) or Catholic (35 per cent) tradition. At eight per cent, there is also a small minority of religious independents -those who currently claim to have no religious affiliation -whose religious origins are primarily drawn from the Protestant tradition (Hayes and McAllister, 2013) . It is important to note, moreover, that this religious affiliation is more than merely nominal: Northern Ireland has traditionally manifested one of the highest levels of religious observance found in Europe (Fahey et al., 2006) . Second, unlike Great Britain, where abortion (albeit with some restrictions) and gay marriage are legally available, both gay marriage and abortion remain legally prohibited in Northern Ireland.
1 Third, and contrary to many other western industrialised societies, the question of gay marriage and abortion remains a highly contentious and ongoing issue within this society. For example, since its establishment in 1998, the Northern Ireland Assembly has voted on a number of separate occasions to prohibit either same-sex marriage or the extension of the 1967
Abortion Act in Britain to Northern Ireland (Hayes and Nagle 2016; Thomson, 2016) .
Believing and belonging: towards a conceptual framework
Sociologists have long recognised that religion is a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing aspects of belief, practice and identity. Only more recently have sociologists of religion begun to also recognise the multiple dimensions and complexity of non-religion (Lee, 2012) , or try to make conceptual and empirical sense of the 'fuzziness' that lies between religion and non-religion (Storm, 2009; Voas and Day, 2010; Stolz et al., 2016) . One of the attempts to capture some of the complexity in a parsimonious way has arisen following Grace Davie's (1994) description of religiosity in Britain as 'believing without belonging.' Davie raised the question about the extent to which individuals in Britain, and indeed many western European nations, continue to hold on to 'deep-seated religious aspirations', despite a notable decline in church attendance and other measures of religious practice.
According to Davie, many Britons, continue to believe -albeit, in a fuzzier, less creedal sense -without attending church regularly, or even infrequently. As Davie (1994, 463) put it: 'More and more people within British society are, it appears, wanting to believe but without putting their belief in practice.' Davie thus argued that religious practices and beliefs could be distinguished analytically, and were at least partially independent of each other.
This contention marked the beginning of some controversy with Davie's thesis attracting criticism from sociologists who adhere to a more traditional theory of secularisation, in which it is generally presumed that belief and practice cannot be separated, at least not in the long-run. (Zuckerman 2008; Kasselstrand 2015) . This phrase has not only been applied as an apt description for scholars writing about established Protestant churches in Scandinavia, but it has also been adopted by some sociologists writing about predominantly Catholic countries, presenting it as a characteristic of a proportion of the population both of Italy (Garelli 2013 ) and the Republic of Ireland.
As Inglis (2007, 216) (Davie 2002; Storm 2009; Stolz et al. 2016) . It is with this complexity in mind that this article focuses on the relationship between religion and moral attitudes in Northern Ireland. More specifically, applying the fourfold typology -the intersection between believing and belonging -it seeks to assess the degree to which individuals who belong but who do not believe, the most understudied group, hold distinct views in terms of their attitudes towards gay marriage and reproductive rights within this society.
Data and methods
The data used in the analysis come from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election Survey. Religion, our primary explanatory variable of interest, is operationalised in terms of the typology of believing and belonging. As in previous research, whereas belief is defined as a belief in God, belonging is operationalised as a regular church attender. And, while we acknowledge that there is some disagreement about how 'belonging' should be operationalised -either as a matter of identity or participationwe adhere to the latter view that 'belonging' is best captured by an indicator of active participation, in practice, regular church attendance (Francis and Robbins 2004) .
Sociologists from a variety of theoretical perspectives have assumed that belief and practice must correspond, at least in the medium term. However, the Davie typology calls into question this assumption. Following Voas and Day's (2010, 5) suggestion as to the need for some further investigation of this issue, we also seek to examine the connection between belief and practice empirically. and practice by outlining the numerical composition on all four groups among the adult population in Northern Ireland as well as by highlighting any differences in socio-economic background between them. Building on this investigation and using multivariate regression analysis, we then focus on the degree to which these differing intersections of belief and practice -particularly among those who belong but do not believe -are a key distinguishing factor in predicting attitudes towards gay marriage and reproductive rights within this society. Table 1 begins the investigation by examining the nature and extent of religious belief and practice in Northern Ireland. A key focus of this investigation is to illustrate the degree to which religious belief and practice are intertwined within this society. As in previous research, the results suggest that Northern Ireland remains a deeply religious society and this is particularly the case when religious belief is considered. While nearly seven in every ten respondents, or 68 per cent of the adult population, claim to believe in God -either with or without doubts -less than one-third say that they do not. Moreover, among those who expressed a belief in God, the vast majority reported that they believed without any doubt. This pattern is repeated when non-believers are considered; among the latter it is intermittent belief rather than non-belief, which is the most reported category.
Believing and belonging: operationalising the typology
[Insert Table 1 about here] A similar, albeit somewhat converse, result emerges when religious observance, or church attendance rates, are considered. While just over two-fifths of individuals, or 44 per cent, claimed to attend church on a regular or at least monthly basis, a majority -or 56 per cent -did not. It is important to note, however, among the latter, that it is less frequent church attendance rather than complete nonattendance which is the most dominant pattern. For example, whereas 46 per cent of all respondents stated that they attended church on a less than monthly basis, the equivalent proportion among those who never attended was just 10 per cent. Thus, at least as far as religious belief and observance in Northern Ireland is concerned, there is some indirect evidence to suggest that in addition to those who believe and belongthe most religiously committed group -there is also a sizeable proportion of the adult population that believe but do not belong.
To investigate this issue directly, Figure 1 [Insert Figure 1 about here]
Who are the culturally religious -those who belong but do not believe?
While much research attention has been paid to the socio-demographic or background characteristics of those who believe and do not belong or to those who neither believe nor belong, this is not the case when the culturally religious, or those who belong but do not believe, are considered (Storm 2009 ). The few studies, albeit predominantly
European, that do exist suggest that in comparison to both the most secular and religiously committed, those who do not believe but belong, are more likely to be male, younger, lesser educated and, when confronted by a Protestant majority, such as in Northern Ireland, they are predominantly drawn from the Catholic tradition (Storm 2009; Kasselstrand 2015; Bullivant 2016; Stolz et al., 2016) . A somewhat more mixed pattern is echoed when those who believe but do not belong are considered, who are again disproportionally male and young but, in this instance, are drawn from among the more educated members of society (Demerath, 2000; Storm 2009; Wilkins-Laflamme 2014) .
To what extent do similar differences occur when the culturally religiousthose who belong but do not believe -in Northern Ireland are considered? Table 2 addresses this question. As in our earlier investigation in Figure 1 , four religious groupings are again distinguished in the analysis with those who belong but do not believe -the culturally religious -as the baseline category of comparison. The results in Table 2 , however, lend only partial support to earlier findings from previous research in the area. Although there were some notable differences in sociodemographic background between the culturally religious and the other religious groupings, only in relation to those who were wholly secular -those who neither believe nor belong -are these differences almost uniform and also markedly distinctive.
Focusing initially on respondents who attend church on a regular basis, only in relation to religious affiliation, age and employment status, are there any notable differences between the two groups in relation to this issue. In comparison to the most religiously committed, not only are the culturally religious significantly more likely to be Catholic but they are also notably more likely to be drawn from the younger and employed sections of the adult population. For example, whereas two-thirds of the culturally religious are members of the Catholic faith, the equivalent proportion among the most religious -those who both believe and belong -is markedly lower at just 48 per cent. A similar finding is echoed when age is considered; younger adults are notably more likely to belong but not believe as compared to their more religiously committed counterparts.
[Insert Table 2 about here] A much more pronounced pattern of difference emerges when comparisons to the non-attenders at religious services are considered and this is particularly the case when those who neither believe nor belong are examined. Here, on all but one attribute -non-manual occupation -there are marked differences between the two groups in terms of their demographic makeup. In comparison to those who neither believe nor belong, whereas those who belong but do not believe were again significantly more likely to be Catholic and, in this instance, drawn from both the well-educated and employed section of the adult population, they were also more likely to be female, married and aged between 18-45 years. For example, while 66 per cent of the culturally religious were members of the Catholic faith and 61 per cent were female, the equivalent proportions among the wholly secular were just 33 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively. This is not the case, however, when the younger members of society, or those aged 18-45 years, were considered; just half of those who did not believe but attended church on a regular basis fell into this category as compared to 66 per cent among the wholly secular. With two notable exceptionsmarital and employment status -these findings are repeated when the sociodemographic profile of those who belong but do not believe versus those who believe but do not belong is compared.
In summary, the results are clear: those who belong but do not believe, or the culturally religious, are more likely to be female, married, among the better educated, and drawn from the Catholic tradition. Moreover, this relationship holds irrespective of whether a comparison with the most religiously committed or those who do not believe or attend are considered. There is also evidence to suggest that while the culturally religious are somewhat similar in their socio-demographic profile to the most religiously committed as well as to those who believe but do not belong, this is not the case when the wholly secular is considered where marked differences occurred in relation to this issue.
Belief, belonging, and attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion
As noted earlier, previous research on gay marriage and abortion rights finds that religious factors, such as affiliation, regular church attendance and beliefs in and about God, are among the most frequent net predictors of opposition to gay marriage and abortion rights. To what extent is this also the case when the intersection between religious beliefs and practices, or the Davie typology, is considered? In other words, are there notable differences between those who belong and do not believe, and the other religiously-defined groups? Table 3 Focusing initially on the attitudes towards gay marriage among the attenders,
here it is non-believers, or the culturally religious, that stand out as the most liberal in their views. For example, whereas two-thirds of those who belong but do not believe agree with gay marriage, the equivalent proportion among the most religiously committed -those who both belong and believe -was notably lower at just 38 per cent. A similar, albeit converse, pattern emerges when lack of support is considered and this is particularly the case among those who strongly disagree. For example, whereas just nine per cent of non-believers who attend church on a monthly basis were strongly opposed to the legalisation of gay marriage and a further six per cent were opposed, the equivalent cumulative proportion among those who both believe and attend was nearly treble this amount at 44 per cent, or 30 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. Thus at least as far as attenders are concerned, it is those who belong but do not believe who are the most liberal in their views.
[Insert Table 3 about here] This is not the case, however, when attitudes among the culturally religious and those who do not attend religious services are compared, where no major differences emerged in terms of their views. For example, whereas 60 per cent of those who believe but do not belong agree with gay marriage or just six percentage points less than our reference group (those who belong but do not believe), the equivalent proportion among the wholly secular was just two percentage points lower at 58 per cent. A similar pattern emerges when those who oppose gay marriage are considered. While an almost identical proportion of the wholly secular and the culturally religious -17 per cent as compared to 15 per cent -disagreed with gay marriage, the equivalent percentage among those who believe but do not belong is somewhat higher at 27 per cent. This is not to discount, however, the much higher proportion of individuals overall, or 52 per cent in this instance, who agree with the legalisation of gay marriage as compared to just 30 per cent who are opposed to such an initiative.
These patterns are replicated when attitudes towards abortion are considered, although it should be noted that levels of support are somewhat lower in this instance.
Focusing initially on the attenders, again it is non-believers, or the culturally religious, that stand out as the most liberal in their views. For example, whereas just over half of those who belong but do not believe agree with the legalisation of abortion, the equivalent proportion among the most religiously committed -those who both belong and believe -was nearly half this amount at just 29 per cent. By contrast, while just 19 per cent of non-believers who attend church on a monthly basis were opposed to abortion rights, the equivalent proportion among the most religiously committed, or believers who attend, is twenty-eight percentage points higher at 47 per cent. Thus, at least as far as attitudes towards abortion among the attenders are concerned, it is again those who belong but do not believe who stand out as the most supportive in their views.
Again, this is not the case, however, when attitudes among the culturally religious are compared with those who do not attend church services, where no major differences emerged in terms of their views. For example, whereas 51 per cent of those who believe but do not belong support abortion, or just two percentage points less than our reference group (those who belong but do not believe), the equivalent proportion among the wholly secular is just five percentage points higher at 56 per cent. A similar pattern emerges when those who oppose abortion are considered.
While an almost identical proportion of the wholly secular and culturally religious -20 per cent as compared to 19 per cent -disagreed with abortion, the equivalent percentage among those who believe but do not belong is just six percentage points higher at 26 per cent. This is not to discount, however, the higher proportion of individuals overall, or 44 per cent in this instance, who agree with the legalisation of abortion as compared to just 31 per cent who are opposed to such an initiative.
To what extent do these differences among the attenders remain when a range of background control variables, such as religious affiliation, gender, marital status, age and socio-economic background, are included in the analysis? Table 4 [Insert Table 4 about here] This is not to suggest, however, that religiosity, or the intersection between religious belief and practice, is the sole predictor of attitudes in this instance. Other significant net determinants include the consistent effects of religious affiliation, gender, age and educational attainment. While females and the educated were notably more supportive of both gay marriage and abortion rights than either males or those with no educational qualifications, older individuals were significantly more negative than their younger counterparts in term of their views. A somewhat more complex pattern emerges when the effect of religious affiliation is considered. As in previous research, while Catholics were notably more likely to support gay marriage than Protestants, they were significantly less likely to do so when the question of abortion rights is considered.
Conclusion
Over the last few decades there has been a dramatic change in public attitudes towards gay rights in the United States, Great Britain and elsewhere in Europe. Although same-sex relations remain a perennial topic of debate within these societies, the overall trend has been a growing acceptance of gay rights and increasing legislative protection for these rights. This is not to negate, however, substantial cross-national variation in relation to this issue, particularly when the issue of same-sex unions, or gay marriage, is considered. Although same-sex relations in general seem to be more widely accepted than a few decades ago, the extent to which same-sex unions are similarly endorsed differs considerably both within and between nations. In fact, some commentators have suggested that disputes over gay rights, such as the legal recognition of same-sex unions, have now replaced abortion rights as one of the most contentious and divisive issues in contemporary western democracies.
It has long been established that religious affiliation, belief and behaviour are associated with an individual's attitudes towards same-sex relations and gay rights. This is also the case when attitudes towards same-sex marriage are considered. There is now a growing body of research to suggest that people who are the most opposed to gay marriages tend to be more religiously devout on a variety of measures such as attachment, belief and practice. In fact, previous research demonstrates that such religious factors are among the strongest predictors of variation in public opinion towards gay marriage and abortion rights. Yet, what we know about the effect of religion on both gay marriage and abortion rights remains somewhat limited. This is particularly so when the intersection of religious belief and belonging is investigated.
Although much attention has been paid to the net effects of these religious measures on attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion rights, to date the intersection of these two factors in determining public views has not been investigated. This is particularly the case for those who belong but do not believe, who have been dismissed in the literature as illogical or at best a transitory stage, as well as socially and politically irrelevant.
The results of this investigation, however, call into question both these assumptions. Our arguments in support of this proposition are threefold. First, at eight per cent of the population, those who belong but do not believe, or the culturally religious, form a notable minority group within Northern Irish society. Second, there is also some evidence to suggest that at least as far as their socio-demographic profile is concerned, the culturally religious may be considered a distinct group. As the results of this investigation also demonstrate, not only are those who belong but do not believe disproportionately drawn from the Catholic tradition, but they are also significantly more likely to be female, married, and among the better-educated members of society. Moreover, this relationship holds regardless of whether comparisons with either the most religiously committed or those who neither believe nor belong are considered. Finally, at least in comparison with the most religiously committed, those who belong but do not believe are also distinctive in terms of their views on new morality issues, such as gay marriage and abortion rights. Irrespective of whether attitudes towards the legalisation of gay marriage or abortion are considered, the culturally religious, or those who belong but do not believe, stand out as significantly more supportive of both these issues than the most religiously committed. Moreover, this relationship remains regardless of whether or not sociodemographic factors are taken into account.
These findings have a number of implications for future research in this area.
First, while religion plays a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of moral issues, such as gay marriage and abortion rights, the impact of religion is both complex and variable and this is particularly the case when the intersection between belief and practice is considered. As the results of this study demonstrates clearly, while no notable differences emerged in comparison to the non-attenders, those who belong but do not believe, or the culturally religious, are notably more likely to adopt a liberal stance in relation to both these issues than the most religiously committed, or those who both belong and believe. It is to a further investigation of this issue, or the intersection between belief and practice, that future research should be directed.
Second, particular attention should be paid to the religious and spiritual background as well as the motivations of those who belong but do not believe. For example, previous research based on the culturally religious in continental Europe suggests that one key factor in accounting for their attendance is their attachment to their national churches as a marker of cultural belonging and a historical heritage (Kasselstrand 2015) .
Further, future studies should also focus on the long-term impact of this divergence in moral views among regular attenders. For example, previous research suggests that persons who attend diverse congregations, such as those with a multiracial composition, are notably more likely to support gay marriage and adoption than those who attend more racially homogeneous ones (Perry 2013 ). To what extent will similar results, or an increasing congruency in moral outlooks, also emerge when the longterm impact of differences in religious belief among the attenders are considered?
Finally, the present research also points to the need for complementary on-the-ground qualitative studies to provide a more fine-grained and nuanced investigation of this understudied minority, those who belong but do not believe, both in terms of their reasons for religious participation and their relations with others, both believers and non-believers as well as those who attend church services and those who do not. As a distinct, theoretically and empirically important minority within Northern Ireland, and elsewhere, there is much to be learned about both their (un)belief and their participation as well as their views on a range of moral and socio-political issues. Alternative analyses, which also included either religious independents (those who currently claim to have no religious affiliation) or the total sample, gave rise to identical substantive conclusions in terms of the effect of our primary variable of interest, namely the impact of religious belief and attachment on attitudes towards gay marriage and abortion rights. Note: Attitudes towards the legalisation of gay marriage and abortion are coded from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree); Standardised regression coefficients are in parentheses; a , omitted category of comparison; *, significant at the 0.05 level; **, significant at the 0.01 level.
